L'Iddri en direct des négociations climat

The negotiations to establish a REDD+ mechanism – to finance avoided deforestation – often reveal striking divergences with the reality in the field. We have known this for some time, and we could even say it is inevitable when international negotiations attempt to solve such a complex problem.

We only have to take a look at some of the side events on the subject to confirm this: the Copenhagen summit is also a place of scientific exchange, alongside the arduous negotiations on a new agreement and new implementation mechanisms for climate mitigation.

Two of these side events have shown this in the last few days, and several lessons can be drawn from them. First, regarding the linkages between a global level of incentives and financing such as REDD+, and the implementation of the policies needed in the countries concerned to impact on the decisions of agents in the field. One researcher thus presented the NAMA-GAMA-LAMA trio (“Nationally/Globally/Locally Appropriate Mitigation Actions”) in reference to the mechanism under discussion for managing sectoral approaches in developing countries (NAMAs), and in order to insist on the difficulty of transferring incentives or actions from one level to another. Other researchers carried on in the same vein, presenting potential domestic institutional frameworks for identifying opportunities, establishing the necessary infrastructure and financing actions, etc. These aspects are all given relatively little attention in the REDD+ negotiations, yet they represent the fundamental conditions for its smooth running.

Another point appears to reveal a divergence between the two discussion areas: the issue of “leakage”, or the fact that deforestation reduction actions may result in increased deforestation in other places. The negotiations on the REDD text tend to evade this aspect, which only appears in one article as things currently stand. This is largely explained by the fact that the mechanism negotiated endeavours to consider the national level to the detriment of a project approach, which in theory tends to reduce the risk of leakage: so long as emissions reductions are recorded at the national level, a country has every interest in ensuring that this leakage does not take place within the country itself. However, during a side event, a researcher presented the findings of a study on Vietnam, where the forest transition has taken place very rapidly, with this country seeing an abrupt turnaround from deforestation to a situation of increasing forest cover. However, the study clearly shows that this evolution is based on international leakage, as almost half of the timber production supplying its industry has simply moved to neighbouring countries.

It is also interesting to note how certain interventions in side events seem to respond to – or rather to accompany – notable changes in the content of the negotiated texts or the oral interventions in negotiating sessions. Two of these remarkable convergences are:

• The relevance of extra-sectoral actions, which the Brazilian delegation likes to point out, is commonly illustrated by researchers: one example is improvements in the efficiency of stoves, whose positive impact has already been assessed in Tanzania. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that these can be achieved without any prior changes to property rights, which is a source of concern (in response to the slogan “no rights, no REDD”).

• On a similar subject, that of directing REDD+ towards a NAMA status as suggested during the negotiations, this can be linked to the findings of research, which tell us that a good deal of investment is needed that cannot realistically be achieved through a market-based REDD mechanism, at least in the short and medium term. The issue of the three phases at the heart of the negotiated REDD text is thus a clear convergence between research and negotiation, for the better in this case.

We will conclude this brief note with an observation heard repeatedly during the side events: “REDD is urgent… but cannot be rushed”. Let there be no misunderstanding: this is about the full implementation of the mechanism and by no means a signal sent to the negotiators to block their attempt to reach an agreement on this issue!

A draft COP/MOP decision has been under discussion since Thursday concerning the reform of the Clean Development Mechanism, based on the report of the CDM Executive Board and the plenary sessions. The matter was not decided in Poznan and was therefore postponed until Copenhagen. A key question in the reform of the CDM is whether or not Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS) technology should be made eligible under the CDM. The full complexity of this question was felt from the moment the parties took the floor during the meeting of the first contact group. A veritable dialogue of the deaf took place between the demands of Grenada and Saudi Arabia and the Executive Board. The question was, however, simple but crucial: “has the Executive Board adopted the findings of the second external consultants’ report on the implications of the inclusion of CCS in the CDM? Yes or no?”. A response was late in coming, but eventually clarified the process: the Executive Board remained divided and did not give an opinion, and the issue therefore fell entirely to the COP/MOP. But it will not be easy to arrive at a clear yes or a no in so little time. Indeed, the informal afternoon session under the AWG-KP clearly marked the opposition between the two conflicting options: the first is to not make CCS eligible under the CDM for the second commitment period; the second is to make it eligible, but requires the SBSTA to make its recommendations to the COP/MOP on the methods and procedures for including CCS, especially on aspects concerning the integrity of long-term storage, the conditions for MRV, the project boundary, the environmental impacts and matters of international law, responsibility, security, counterproductive side-effects or risk coverage.

Unsurprisingly, the most vulnerable developing countries, with Micronesia leading the way on behalf of AOSIS, declared themselves in favour of the first option. Some even supported Micronesia’s proposal to amend the text and to accompany the non-eligibility of CCS with all the aforementioned reservations. Once again unsurprisingly, some coal-using developed and emerging countries and oil-producing countries supported the second option. The gap is wide, and difficult to bridge. It directly reflects the differing conceptions of the very nature of the Clean Development Mechanism and, therefore, of what it could finance: is it advisable to include in this mechanism renewable technologies or those linked to energy efficiency in the same way as low-carbon solutions using fossil fuels? Beyond this debate, we can make several reflections on the advisability of including CCS in the CDM: the first is that the cost of CCS is such that it appears unlikely that the CER price will offset the price per tonne of CO2 linked to this technology (according to some estimations, at best 50 euros/tonne). However, this would be a means of freeing a new source of financing for projects in developing countries. Furthermore, the nature of developed and developing country commitments is still uncertain, as is, therefore, the role that will be given to market mechanisms in the post-2012 regime. This uncertainty regarding demand and the fact that CCS projects would be likely to generate large volumes of credits may raise problems of incentives for investing in a balanced portfolio of mitigation technologies in developing countries, and thereby reveal competition between technologies within CDM projects.

The negotiations on one of the most advanced issues within the Copenhagen process – the REDD mechanism to combat tropical deforestation – are frankly laborious, but are occasionally prompting instructive exchanges. This was the case on Wednesday, when a number of developing countries quite fiercely opposed the first articles of the text put on the table. These articles, initially proposed by Europe, set out quantified targets that should be aimed at in terms of combating deforestation: halting deforestation by 2030, by first halving gross deforestation (excluding land where forest cover is progressing) by 2020. This may not bring to mind any apocalyptic visions. Yet it is a considerable challenge given the force of this phenomenon and the complexity of the factors that result in the destruction of millions of hectares of tropical forest every year. Here, we are dealing with an engine for development via export crops, with the creation of fields for food security reasons, and with hurdles to the diffusion and adoption of agricultural technologies aimed at increasing yields, etc.

So should such targets really be announced for 2020 or 2030? The developing countries tend to say that this is not justified, since REDD and the fight against deforestation are purely voluntary mechanisms. This is in fact what has enabled the talks to progress on this subject until now, and confusion is likely to arise if quantified targets are put forward. Furthermore, there is no solid scientific basis – once again according to many of the countries directly concerned – for a 50% cut in deforestation by 2020. Why not 30%, or 70%?

In response to these arguments, Europe says that its intention has been wrongly interpreted: these targets should be understood as part of a collective effort, since the developed countries would then also be responsible for providing the financial support needed to meet these targets. Moreover, Europe maintains that there is a scientific basis as it has been proved that the emissions from tropical forests are so high (between 12 and 20% of global GHG emissions) that the final objective of limiting global warming to 2 degrees cannot be achieved without serious action at this level.

It is not unthinkable that there may be a connection between the rejection of quantified REDD targets, even indicative ones, and the leak earlier this week of a draft Copenhagen Agreement prepared on the initiative of the Danish Presidency. The increasing mistrust among developing countries could thus partly explain why they are particularly sensitive to anything that might resemble a quantified constraint on their emissions. A potential way out has been proposed indirectly by Brazil, which does its utmost to reiterate whenever the opportunity arises (in other words fairly often!) that the most important thing is not to define strict perimeters for emissions linked to the future of tropical forests (conversion, degradation, increasing stocks, etc.), but rather to develop the means to act on the causes of these emissions, and especially on agriculture, which is not a component of the “forestry sector” per se. Thus, focusing more on effective action against these causes through “extra-sectoral actions” should take precedence over controversial attempts to set targets for the forests themselves within REDD, which until proof to the contrary, remains a purely voluntary mechanism.