The negotiations to establish a REDD+ mechanism – to finance avoided deforestation – often reveal striking divergences with the reality in the field. We have known this for some time, and we could even say it is inevitable when international negotiations attempt to solve such a complex problem.

We only have to take a look at some of the side events on the subject to confirm this: the Copenhagen summit is also a place of scientific exchange, alongside the arduous negotiations on a new agreement and new implementation mechanisms for climate mitigation.

Two of these side events have shown this in the last few days, and several lessons can be drawn from them. First, regarding the linkages between a global level of incentives and financing such as REDD+, and the implementation of the policies needed in the countries concerned to impact on the decisions of agents in the field. One researcher thus presented the NAMA-GAMA-LAMA trio (“Nationally/Globally/Locally Appropriate Mitigation Actions”) in reference to the mechanism under discussion for managing sectoral approaches in developing countries (NAMAs), and in order to insist on the difficulty of transferring incentives or actions from one level to another. Other researchers carried on in the same vein, presenting potential domestic institutional frameworks for identifying opportunities, establishing the necessary infrastructure and financing actions, etc. These aspects are all given relatively little attention in the REDD+ negotiations, yet they represent the fundamental conditions for its smooth running.

Another point appears to reveal a divergence between the two discussion areas: the issue of “leakage”, or the fact that deforestation reduction actions may result in increased deforestation in other places. The negotiations on the REDD text tend to evade this aspect, which only appears in one article as things currently stand. This is largely explained by the fact that the mechanism negotiated endeavours to consider the national level to the detriment of a project approach, which in theory tends to reduce the risk of leakage: so long as emissions reductions are recorded at the national level, a country has every interest in ensuring that this leakage does not take place within the country itself. However, during a side event, a researcher presented the findings of a study on Vietnam, where the forest transition has taken place very rapidly, with this country seeing an abrupt turnaround from deforestation to a situation of increasing forest cover. However, the study clearly shows that this evolution is based on international leakage, as almost half of the timber production supplying its industry has simply moved to neighbouring countries.

It is also interesting to note how certain interventions in side events seem to respond to – or rather to accompany – notable changes in the content of the negotiated texts or the oral interventions in negotiating sessions. Two of these remarkable convergences are:

  • The relevance of extra-sectoral actions, which the Brazilian delegation likes to point out, is commonly illustrated by researchers: one example is improvements in the efficiency of stoves, whose positive impact has already been assessed in Tanzania. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that these can be achieved without any prior changes to property rights, which is a source of concern (in response to the slogan “no rights, no REDD”).
  • On a similar subject, that of directing REDD+ towards a NAMA status as suggested during the negotiations, this can be linked to the findings of research, which tell us that a good deal of investment is needed that cannot realistically be achieved through a market-based REDD mechanism, at least in the short and medium term. The issue of the three phases at the heart of the negotiated REDD text is thus a clear convergence between research and negotiation, for the better in this case.

We will conclude this brief note with an observation heard repeatedly during the side events: “REDD is urgent… but cannot be rushed”. Let there be no misunderstanding: this is about the full implementation of the mechanism and by no means a signal sent to the negotiators to block their attempt to reach an agreement on this issue!